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At a closed presentation earlier this year (2009), a
provincial Disaster Management executive2
responded to criticism of South Africa's non-
adherence to certain humanitarian assistance
standards by stating that Disaster Management
had followed a high-level decision that assistance
to foreign nationals displaced by the May 2008
xenophobic attacks should not exceed the living
conditions of South Africans living in poverty. At
first glance, this seems a reasonable position to
take. Its common-sense quality flows from the
following logic: 1) Citizens are the true political
objects of the state and therefore most deserving
of its assistance. 2) It would not be fair for non-
citizens to benefit from forms of state assistance
that are not available to citizens. 3) It would be
natural for citizens to react with anger if non-
citizens were seen to be favoured (indeed, it was
argued that perceptions of South Africans' relative
deprivation when compared to non-nationals had
caused the attacks in the first place). The results:
1) citizen anger could worsen an already explosive
situation of anti-foreigner violence, and 2) citizen
anger could turn the electorate against elected
leaders at various levels.
The rationale is seductive. But consider, for a
moment, that the very same logic was used to
justify the displacement of foreign nationals in the
first place. Non-nationals were perceived, rightly
or wrongly, to occupy a more favourable social
and economic position to poor citizens, or,
through their activities, to frustrate South
Africans' opportunities to rise in the social and
economic hierarchy.3 In fieldwork conducted by
the Forced Migration Study Project (FMSP)
during 2008,4 many of the South African
participants who shunned the violent means used
by those perpetrating the xenophobic violence
supported the end result of displacement, on the
assumption that their life chances would be
improved in the absence of 'competition' from
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The South African government declared last year's xenophobic attacks over on 28 May 2008.1 As early as
July 2008, it began to assure displaced foreigners that conditions were favourable for their return to
affected communities, and that it would be safe to do so. Yet in the past year there have been repeated
attacks in a number of the same communities that fell victim to immigration-control-by-mob in 2008.
Why? In this article we argue that the state's reluctance to protect and assist foreigners in the past
perpetuates violence, social instability and injustice – for nationals and non-nationals alike. We examine
the source of this reluctance, and show how it creates the conditions for weak protection and judicial
responses.  
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non-nationals. When the response to popular
violence against a stigmatised group takes its
rationale from the perpetrators, the outlook for
justice and security is poor. And indeed, although
62 people died in the 2008 crisis, over a year later
only one murder case has resulted in conviction.5
THE STRUCTURAL PREJUDICE
AGAINST NON-CITIZENS
The South African Constitution and the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act, 2000, specifically prohibit
forms of prejudice such as racism or sexism. But a
prejudice for citizens and against non-citizens is
intrinsic to the very structure of the
contemporary, territorial state. In the state as a
political form, a relationship is naturalised
between a relatively centralised political authority,
a territory, and the population of that territory,
defined through citizenship laws. Intrinsic to this
system are those who are not the natural residents
and beneficiaries of the state. Permanent
residents, and those with a variety of permits or
statuses, including refugee status, reside in the
territory in a relationship that is by definition
'unnatural' – foreigners become citizens only
through the process that is literally called
naturalisation. And even then they may once
again be at risk of being rendered unnatural if
they do not conform to standards set by the state. 
In other words, prejudice against foreigners is
naturalised through the state as a political form.
The moral panic that presents xenophobia as a
psychological pathology often obscures the
structural nature of this prejudice. Furthermore,
the inherent favour the state shows its 'natural'
citizens necessarily forms a fault line that
threatens the realisation of human and
constitutional rights that should apply without
reservation.
In this article we examine the South African
state's responses to the internal displacement of
non-citizens by anti-foreigner attacks. We show
how the naturalised prejudice of the state and its
bureaucracy towards citizens – its structural
xenophobia, as it were – has informed the
response to violent xenophobia in the country.
Finally, we illustrate the obstacle this prejudice
poses to effective prevention of future attacks,
and the threats to security and justice that it




The South African state's responses to the
xenophobic violence of May 2008 were
characterised by a number of failures that –
deliberately or otherwise – supported the
intentions of perpetrators, further criminalised
the victims, and promoted future security risks
for non-nationals (and by extension, as we saw in
the May 2008 attacks, the South African
communities in which they live). We discuss
these failures below. They include failure to
prevent violence, failure to protect victims during
the attacks (both from victimisation and from
deportation), failure to prioritise prosecution of
the offenders throughout the judicial process,
and a reluctant approach to humanitarian
assistance and reintegration.
Failure to prevent violence and
protect victims
May 2008 was not the first time xenophobic
violence occurred in many of the affected areas.
For instance, prior attacks on non-nationals had
occurred in Alexandra (1994-95);6 Diepsloot
(2004, 2006, March and April 2008);7 the East
Rand (1996, 1999);8 the West Rand (2001, 2007);
Johannesburg CBD (1997);9 and areas of the
Western Cape including Hout Bay (1994),10
Milnerton (2001),11 and Masiphumelele and
Knysna (2006).12 That many attacks recurred in
places that had experienced similar breakdowns
in order in the recent past is strongly suggestive
of a failure to manage risk in these areas. This
prompts the question, if citizens had been the
victims of the attacks, would risk management
have been equally poor? As South Africa has
since 1994 seldom experienced ethnic-based
violence of the scale and nature perpetrated
against foreigners, it is difficult to give a
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definitive answer to this question. But the
seemingly natural character of anxiety about
foreigners, and the tendency to see risk primarily
in terms of the presence of non-nationals rather
than the prospect of attacks against them, may
encourage a greater tolerance of anti-foreigner
initiatives at a local level. For instance, at a
meeting in Alexandra prior to the May 11 attacks,
a policeman told community members that
'people must decide on how they deal with
someone who has entered his kraal and took his
cattle.'13
The failure to manage risk in the face of threats to
foreigners' security is seen once again in areas
where, prior to the May 2008 attacks, police
and/or local authorities were aware of the
meetings in which attacks were organised, or were
even present when communities threatened to
take the law into their own hands, but launched
no preventative response. This was the case in
Alexandra, for instance,14 where police appeared
to be well aware of the meetings in which attacks
were organised. Said one senior police official:
Prior to the attacks, there was a meeting on the
10th of May, 2008 and it was decided that they
will attack around the hostel and the shack area.
This was not the first meeting; it was a follow
up meeting.15
Elsewhere, respondents observed the role played
by participatory governance structures – which
exist to enhance democracy and security – in
encouraging attacks. This role was sometimes one
of omission rather than commission, but as such
demonstrates the risks of failing to muster the will
to prevent anti-foreigner violence. As a
respondent in Madelakufa II noted:16
This would not have happened were the street
committees doing their job. They were in
meetings with the street committees, and they
did this thing, and the street committees just
stood back […] remember that in Madelakufa I,
this thing did not happen because the street
committees and members of the community
stood together and said no one was going to
come in and kill another human being. But here
since the street communities did not stand up to
the violence, people came and did what they
liked with us.
Community members interviewed in affected
areas generally reported that the local police, as
representatives of the state, were reluctant to
intervene on behalf of victims during the attacks.
On the one hand, local police were under-
equipped to respond to large-scale violence and
could not be everywhere at once, but on the other,
some were seen to be intimidated by the prospect
of opposing what appeared to be the general will
of the people (for good reason – in Itireleng, a
police officer who fired rubber bullets was later
assaulted by community members). This created
public perceptions that police supported the anti-
immigrant agenda carried out through the attacks,
as evident in the following exchange among
participants in the male focus group conducted in
Sector 2, Alexandra:
RESPONDENT A1 They were there. Nothing
could happen if police did not want it to
happen. Police were watching. If police were
tight like the police that came after, nothing
would have happen.
RESPONDENT A2 The campaign to remove
foreigners went on till the early hours of the
morning. The police were always present.
RESPONDENT A2  It is because police were
already fed up with foreigners and so, they
somehow supported us. 
Although some respondents attributed protection
failures to the fact that police were outnumbered
and overwhelmed, others had witnessed particular
officers joining the mobs, or actively assisting in
the looting of goods.17 This may have fuelled the
impression that state actors were complicit in the
anti-foreigner campaign. Moreover, many
evacuations were done at the expense of protecting
non-nationals' property and livelihoods, leading to
rampant house robbery, arson, malicious damage
to property and appropriation of homes.18 This
suggested that local police and elected authorities
lacked the will to invest resources in the return of
non-nationals at a later date. In Sector 5,
Alexandra, where the ward and block committees
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actively prevented the looting of non-nationals'
shops and homes, individuals sheltering at the
police station were able to return to their shacks
and trading posts in the immediate aftermath of
the attacks. In areas where property was not
protected, foreign residents were displaced
permanently or for a longer period,19 and their
long absence facilitated opportunistic crime even
after the initial wave of violence.20
By the time then-President Thabo Mbeki
approved army deployment to end the disorder on
21 May 2008, 24 people had been killed and 
24 000 were reported displaced in the preceding
ten days of seemingly uncontrolled violence,
which was made highly visible by constant media
coverage.21 By the time a provincial disaster was
declared in Gauteng on May 30, at least 342 shops
belonging to foreigners across the country had
been looted, and 213 burnt down, decimating the
livelihoods of hundreds of households. A total of 
1 384 suspects had been arrested in connection
with the attacks (the resulting cases will be
discussed later in this article).22 It is important to
note here the research suggesting that the state's
late and indecisive response to prevent and stop
the violence further heightened security risks to
non-nationals and their communities of residence,
by encouraging outbreaks in communities that
were not initially affected.23 Arguably, it also
encouraged the unmonitored flight of victims,
who became invisible and thus untraceable once
cases went to court.
Deportation of victims
That victims of attacks are seen first and foremost
as outsiders to the national community, rather
than as members of the local communities they
were displaced from, is evident in police recourse
to 'voluntary' and involuntary deportation as a
response to victimisation. In March 2008 the
Department of Home Affairs (DHA) sent
immigration officers to arrest undocumented
victims who had taken refugee at Laudium police
station after attacks in Itireleng.24
Similar arrests and deportations were made at
least once during the May 2008 attacks: on 15 May
2008, 32 non-nationals who were attacked in
Olifantsfontein on the East Rand were charged
with illegal immigration and scheduled for
deportation. On the same day, Minister of Home
Affairs Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula said foreigners
made vulnerable by the attacks would not be
deported, regardless of their immigration status.25
This suggests an incoherent attitude within the
Home Affairs bureaucracy, or at least a failure to
effectively communicate with police as the
implementing arm for border control activities.
Also, halting deportations appeared to be a
philanthropic move, and as such its security
implications went unrecognised: deporting victims
and witnesses is not only an affront to the
vulnerability of a population in humanitarian
need, but also a stumbling block to the judicial
response and hence to future security.
If the security implications of deportation had
been recognised, perhaps we would have seen
fewer instances of government representatives
organising ‘voluntary’ deportations and buses to
return the willing to their countries of origin. This
was reported in the press as early as the second
day of attacks in Gauteng.26 In Ramaphosa the
local councillor was involved in organising buses
for ‘voluntary’ deportation,27 and in KwaZulu-
Natal at least 300 people had been ‘voluntarily’
deported from Cato Manor and Greenwood police
stations in Durban by 25 May 2008.28
This is not to suggest sinister motives on the part
of officials who organised ‘voluntary’ deportations,
often at the request of victims, but simply to
question what may have appeared to be a 'logical'
solution to the dilemma facing non-nationals.
Aside from the impossibility of a truly 'voluntary'
return in a context of escalating violence; little
prospect of return to communities of residence;
and a lack of protection and welfare guarantees; it
is important to recognise the disservice to the
cause of justice that was done through
deportations, whether 'voluntary' or otherwise. A
report by the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development specifically links the
NPA's withdrawal of the majority of xenophobia-
related cases to the fact that 'witnesses became
missing or left the country.'29 The irony is that the
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'assistance' rendered to foreign nationals willing to
return home in the heat of the violence may in
fact have helped to eliminate the prospect of
justice for the 40 per cent of cases withdrawn. In
this way, by its evacuation and deportation efforts,
the state supported the intention of perpetrators
to remove foreigners from communities,
contributed to stalling judicial measures against
perpetrators of violence, and, where deportation
was involuntary, criminalised undocumented
victims rather than their assailants. 
Failure to prioritise prosecution
Since 1994 foreign nationals have repeatedly been
attacked in South Africa, but few perpetrators
have been charged, let alone convicted. This has
two effects. First, where attacks are due to
mobilisation by particular figures,30 these
individuals and their agendas remain a risk for the
stability of communities in which they operate.
Second, a message of impunity is communicated,
which at best removes a disincentive to
perpetrators and would-be perpetrators, and at
worst legitimises attacks by suggesting that the
state supports an anti-immigrant agenda.
Thus, flawed state responses to initial attacks may
promote the risk of future violence. In some
instances, state agents have actively protected
those accused of anti-foreigner violence. In
Masiphumelele outside Cape Town, for instance,
the former Western Cape Provincial Premier,
Ebrahim Rasool, the MEC for Community Safety,
Leonard Ramatlakane, and the Ocean View police
reportedly intervened to secure the release of
business owners who had been arrested after
xenophobic violence in 2006.31 Little wonder, then,
that violence recurred in 2008, motivated once
again by business interests.32
In some cases, suspects in the May 2008 violence
were released without charges, due to community
protests and mobilisation. In the case of Itireleng
for example, charges against 11 suspects, including
members of the informal leadership structure
accused of instigating the May attacks in that area,
were withdrawn after a protest march to the court
on the day of the hearing. The local councillor
had advised members of the community that if
they 'tell the police that they did this as a group
not as individuals,' police would comply with a
demand for the suspects' release.33
The NPA committed itself to prioritise and fast-
track cases resulting from the May 2008
xenophobic attacks, and its progress indicates that
it followed through. When compared with
somewhat dated South African Law Reform
Commission (SALRC) research conducted in
1999, the case finalisation rate for the prioritised
xenophobia cases after May 2008 is more than
double that for randomly sampled violent crimes
(28 per cent versus 11 per cent). Only ten per cent
of cases that are just over a year old are yet to be
tried, as opposed to 75 per cent of two-year-old
cases found in the SALRC sample. However, the
case withdrawal rate is four times higher among
the xenophobia cases than among the SALRC
sample (40 per cent versus ten per cent), and for
this reason, the higher levels of finalisation do not
necessarily indicate a successful judicial response
– as evidenced by the single murder case that has
resulted in conviction thus far.34
This demonstrates the integrated nature of judicial
processes, which cannot succeed in the wake of a
disaster unless specific measures are taken in
advance to track the whereabouts of mobile
victims and witnesses. It is our argument that such
measures were not taken while victims of attacks
were sheltering at police stations, or during the
steady attrition from camp-based shelters, because
of the tendency to see non-nationals primarily in
terms of their non-citizenship and thus as outside
the mandate of government agencies (other than
the DHA). Investigating after the fact, under
perpetual resource constraints and in the absence
of mechanisms for tracking the displaced
population, is bound to be futile. As noted further
on, the failure, especially in Gauteng, to launch a
concerted reintegration campaign probably also
impacted upon levels of case withdrawal and
successful conviction.
Another reason that has been given for the 208
case withdrawals reported by the NPA is failure to
obtain an interpreter.35 This seems a very poor
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reason for withdrawal of a case, and evidence that
these cases were insufficiently prioritised in
provinces such as Gauteng, where the special
courts envisioned by the NPA36 never
materialised.
failed to recognise, or was indifferent to, the effects
on judicial outcomes of forced mobility caused by
crises such as this. Consequently, there has been a
high degree of impunity, despite the efforts of the
NPA. As other analysts have observed,40 this can
only encourage the ill-intentioned to attack
foreigners and outsiders.
Reluctant approach to humanitarian
assistance
Humanitarianism is based on principles of human
rights and non-discrimination, as is the South
African Constitution. It follows that foreign
citizenship should not be used as a legitimate basis
for discriminatory treatment of any kind. But in
fact, issues of immigration status impacted on
government responses to the May 2008 attacks to
quite a substantial degree.
First, despite the obvious fact that the DHA has
limited capacity to coordinate and carry out its
existing functions of immigration management –
let alone the capacity to mount any kind of social
assistance response – other government organs
were keen to see the DHA as the lead department
for the humanitarian response.41 Almost a year later,
Disaster Management staff continued to express
this sentiment to FMSP researchers in one
province.42 On the most basic level, this represents
the tendency to see victims of xenophobic attacks
primarily as outsiders to the state rather than as
residents of the country in need of protection. 
Responding to the xenophobic attacks became a hot
potato between local and provincial governments in
more than one province.43 The worst affected was
Durban, where by June 2008 no provincial disaster
had yet been declared and the City refused to assist
displaced people, saying it was not their
responsibility. Eventually, after being assaulted by
security guards, homeless displaced people living
on the steps of Durban City Hall were moved to
Albert Park, where they slept without shelter until a
humanitarian agency set up a tent for them.44 The
City's failure to see foreign nationals as their
responsibility meant that there was no attempt to
risk-manage their reintegration, or address their
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Figure 1: Judicial processing of violent crime
cases reported in 1997/98, by October 1999.37
Figure 2: Judicial processing of prioritised
xenophobia cases reported in 2008, by July 2009.38
It is essential to prioritise convictions for crimes
resulting from forms of mobilisation that result in
large-scale attacks, arson and destruction, and a
general breakdown in the rule of law. These pose
risks beyond the targeted individuals, especially
in informal settlements where the dangers of fire
are aggravated and the dense, poorly lit
environment hinders policing. The May 2008
attacks created an opportunity for a number of
criminals to carry out looting or assassinations
under cover of the general chaos. As conviction
rates in South Africa are generally low, the higher
rates obtained in the prioritised xenophobia cases
– especially for rape39 – are worthy of celebration,
and it is surprising that more has not been made
of these convictions by the media. But the
disproportionate withdrawal rate suggests that
priority status was given to these cases too late to
ensure that justice was served, and that the system
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security risks of this failure became all the more
clear in January 2009: two foreigners died when a
mob attempted to evict them from a building just
metres from the police station in Albert Park.45
A report commissioned by Oxfam to evaluate the
humanitarian response to the attacks records
anxieties within government about public
perceptions of aid to non-citizens.46 Concerns did
not only revolve around the possible risks of these
perceptions, but also around political legitimacy:
municipal and provincial officials feared voter
reactions if they were seen to be sympathising
with or allocating resources to foreign nationals. 
Arguably, this was a contributor to the generally
inadequate response to the protection needs of
displaced non-nationals, specifically in terms of
their reintegration or resettlement into South
African communities, as discussed below. But
inadequate and inconsistent provision within
temporary shelters established by government
caused attrition in the camp population, including
'voluntary repatriation', and does not seem to have
been monitored.47 Unmanaged early departure
from the camps – and later departures as
government deliberately reduced service provision
to create a push factor out of the Gauteng camps48
– thus posed a security threat to non-nationals
returning to still-unstable communities. It also
impeded the justice process when witnesses could
not be found, or complainants became reluctant to
pursue cases.49 Nor were the movements of the
displaced population monitored, even in the less
chaotic encamped stages of the displacement. 
Inadequate monitoring and evaluation of the
reintegration process,50 and little, if any, attempt to
prepare host communities for the return of
displaced foreigners, meant that victims returned
to situations of unresolved tension, where popular
leaders who played a role in the attacks continued
to dominate some communities.51 In this
intimidating context it is unsurprising that some
complainants who had 'reintegrated' into
communities from which they were displaced,
dropped their cases. A number of displaced
foreigners were killed or injured on attempting to
reintegrate,52 while others were forced to pay
protection fees.53 Repeated attacks that destabilise
areas and put whole communities at risk have been
the long term consequence of continuing tensions
and impunity for rogue leaders – for instance in
Masiphumele and Du Noon in late 2008 and early
2009.
The state's obvious lack of will to assist or
meaningfully engage with the displaced population
in the camps led to tensions between nationalities,
and between displaced persons and government
officials. These tensions, and the increasing
politicisation of the camp population, plagued the
social world of the camps and led to a number of
security concerns, particularly at the Soetwater,
Glenanda (Rifle Range Road) and Acasia
settlements. Hunger strikes, suicide threats,
fighting and hostage-taking became commonplace.
The priority given to ending humanitarian
assistance to non-nationals, particularly in
Gauteng, provides further evidence of a
disinclination to assist those who are not seen to be
the legitimate object of government welfare
attention. The Province flouted a court ruling by
closing the camps at the end of September 2008.54
Lack of commitment to
reintegration
There was much talk of reintegration after the May
2008 attacks, but the shape this took was a far cry
from the way it is defined by the UNHCR. Broadly
defined, reintegration refers to return and
acceptance of a person as a participant member of
a community. As such, the term is used to describe
the re-entry of formerly displaced people into the
social, economic, cultural and political fabric of
their original community. According to the
UNHCR, reintegration, as it refers to returning
refugees, requires access to reasonable resources,
opportunities and basic services to establish a self-
sustained livelihood in conditions of equal rights
with other residents and citizens.55 Reintegration
should therefore be distinguished from return (the
process of going back to one's place of original
residence) or resettlement, which refers to the
process of starting a new life in another part of the
country.56
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Successful reintegration after conflict-induced
displacement requires a number of sine qua non
voluntary and participatory processes. These need
to be informed by an adequate understanding and
resolution of root causes of the
conflict/displacement; evidence of the rule of law
to quell fears about Internally Displaced Persons'
(IDP) security and future;57 and recovery of
property, or compensation facilitated by the
relevant authorities. These guidelines relate to
IDPs reintegrating within their home countries,
and refugees returning home from countries of
asylum. For South Africa, where reintegration
involved the anomalous categories of non-national
IDPs, or refugees-turned-IDPs in their country of
asylum, there are no clear guidelines or
frameworks, placing the IDPs in a position of
heightened vulnerability and further eroding the
political will to assist them. Perhaps this explains
why the Gauteng Provincial government 'publicly
dismissed the contention that it had any
responsibility to ensure proper and sustained
support for the reintegration of IDPs who
remained in CoSS [Centres of Safe Shelter] in
September [2008]'.58 But, if nothing else, the
security risks of failing to properly reintegrate
non-national victims of the attacks should have
sufficed to arouse that will.
In South Africa, the much-vaunted 'reintegration'
of non-nationals has been more like simple return
or resettlement. It was unmanaged and
involuntary in Gauteng, where to this day those
known to be responsible for the 2008 attacks in
their communities remain at large. 'Reintegration'
was forced upon the displaced population through
the cessation of support and closure of the camps,
but also upon communities that evicted non-
nationals by unilateral directives that were in some
cases met with outrage by affected communities,
boding ill for long-term stability:
I do not understand how government arrives at
this decision. We were not consulted.
(Respondent from Itireleng)
…the South African government is protecting
migrants more than us. The government is
saying we must accept them back. What about
the crimes they are committing to us? What
about our complaints? (Respondent from
Alexandra)
In addition, post-response evaluations have noted
the greater priority given to closing camp-based
shelters rather than identifying safe communities
for reintegration or resettlement, as well as the
failure to adequately track the reintegrating
population.59 It is not surprising, then, that
violence has recurred in several communities of
'reintegration,' and where it has not recurred as
yet, there is no certainty about how long the
apparent peace will last.
CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates the importance of a
strong will at every level of government to assist
and protect victims of xenophobic attacks, thereby
securing long term security and justice for all. We
argue that though it may appear 'natural' to view
victims of xenophobic attacks primarily as
'foreigners' rather than as fully fledged members of
the communities in which they are attacked,
viewing them in this way leads to a series of flawed
responses at a variety of levels of government that,
seen together, confound the judicial process. The
resultant impunity allows individuals who are
threats to community safety to remain at large,
sometimes in positions of informal leadership, and
thus perpetuates the risk of future instability. A
few basic recommendations can be drawn for
future responses to xenophobic attacks. 
1) A risk management framework and early 
response mechanisms must be developed to
ensure that threats to evict foreigners are
registered and that related anxieties are
addressed. Tensions must be lowered by
finding peaceful solutions rather than
heightened by denying the validity of locals'
concerns, however misled.
2) Awareness must be raised among police of 
their key role in ensuring successful
prosecutions from the onset of attacks.
3) Conflict resolution negotiations should steer 
clear of satisfying demands for impunity.
Where participatory governance structures are
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responsible for attacks, whether by omission or
commission, they should be investigated and
guilty parties prosecuted if appropriate.
4) Local police, who are embedded in the politics 
of their areas and may be intimidated by the
informal forces at play, are not the ideal force
to protect victims of attacks. When attacks
occur, police from other localities should
immediately be deployed for protection
activities. 
5) To the greatest extent possible, victims' homes 
should be protected from criminal onslaught
during their displacement. This preserves
victims' livelihoods and communicates the
message to attackers that their agenda is
unsupported and that the state intends to
return displaced persons to the community.
6) Documented and undocumented displaced 
persons should be registered in the immediate
wake of attacks with a view to future tracing of
witnesses and complainants (police or DHA
officials are not best placed for this task).
Undocumented witnesses or victims must
receive guarantees that they will not be
deported as a result of their involvement in
reported cases. Details should include next of
kin whose places of residence may be more
permanent.
7) Priority should be given to xenophobia-related 
cases, and investments made in obtaining
interpreters to lower the case withdrawal rate.
8) Deportations should be avoided and where 
victims are voluntarily returned to their
countries, registration on the tracing list
should be a precondition. 
9) Reintegration or managed resettlement 
planning should commence immediately, with
the involvement of displaced persons and the
local community. In partnership with
UNHCR, government must systematically
assess areas for amenability to reintegration or
resettlement. Areas of resettlement or
reintegration and new addresses should be
recorded on the tracing list.
10)Successful convictions of perpetrators should 
be communicated to the media in a manner
that promotes visible coverage, as a strategy to
counter impressions of impunity at a wider
scale.
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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